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POLITICAL REFORM AND 
REALIGNMENT IN ITALY (I) 
The Impact of 1989 and an Italian Response 
Hideko Magara 
Introduction 
In 1989， a storm of democratization blew through East European 
countries which had been suffering persistent economic stagnation and 
dictatorship. The first free election was carried out in Poland in June 1989 
in which “Solidarity" won a sweeping victory and the first non-communist 
government was born. In Hungary， reformist forces which had been 
expanding their influences gradualIy introduced a competitiv1巴multi-party
system and promoted democratization in a“reform from above" manner. 
In October， the communist party transformed itself into the socialist party 
in name and in reality. At the same time， the newly organized party 
applied for participation to the SociaIist International in which democratic 
socialist parties gathered， and made a new step toward realizing a market 
economy and democracy. These waves of democratization and liberaliza-
J¥ tion in Poland and Hungary gave rise to sequential waves for changes in 四
~、、
other East European countries. In East Germany， Honecker withdrew in 
October， and eventually the Berlin Wall dramaticalIy collapsed in Novem-
ber. Meanwhile， also in Bulgaria and Czech， the communist leaders 
resigned. A limited self-reform initiated by the reformist groups within the 
J¥ 
regime faced a large-scale citizens' offensive demanding thorough democ-
ratization， and the communist one--party dominance was abqndoned. In 
Romania， inDecember毛 thedictatorship was overturned， although through 
a violent confronation. 
The surge of changes in East Europe triggered a move for political 
realignment in West Europe， and shook the entirety of the European 
political world at the roots. This made the巴bbof non-democratics trend 
in Europe clear， and brought about a situation in which the unification 
among leftist parties could be possible by canceling out old confrontations 
between socialists and communists both in international and domestic 
l巴V巴Is.Domestically， the communist parties in each West European coun“ 
try have had their democratic character called into question by citizens 
and rank and file members of the parties. All the parties that had been 
clinging to democτatic centralism suffered a crushing blow. In France， 
criticism for the Secretary恥1arche'was heated， and the reformist factions 
within the party demanded a reshuffling of the leadership. In Spain and 
Portugal， citizens' support for the communist parties dropped drastically. 
1、heGreek communist party tried to form a new party in aIliance with non 
communist left. Italian and Swedish communist parties chose a change of 
party name 
Internationally， a series of East European reforms accel己ratedthe 
emergenc巴ofand expanded the scope of a unified political space toward 
European integration. Remarkable victories of social d巴mocraticparties in 
the European parliament elections in June 1989 seemed to repaint the neo 
-conservatist European political map to leftist predominance. As a matter 
of fact， in th巴“Stockholmdeclaration" presented by the Socialist Interna-
tional at that time， solidarity among social democratic parties in each 
country was emphasized. Such a move， which could be distinguished from 
traditional social d巴mocracyrepresented by the Swedish model that had 
b巴巴ndomestically developed mainly on the workers' base， seemed to 
suggest social democratic innovation on a European level b巴yondnational 
borders. As the “Berlin Program" of the West German SPD symbolized， an 
industrialist， old social democracy aiming mainly at the protection of 
workers' interests was transforming into a more universalistic form of 
democracy targeting every citizen as illustrated by environmental protec-
tionism. Furthermore， this tendency， involving East European countries 
which were acquiring Polyarchy (political democracy)， lead to basic self 
examination of the raison d'etre of European left and its role. 
1n this context， Italy which had the biggest communist party in West 
Europe drew attention. The Italian Communist Party (Partito COJnunista 
Italiano， PCI)， which once was in the vanguard of Eurocommunism and 
long pursued a reformist line， abandoned democratic centralism by its own 
initiative in March 1989. Then， in March 1990， itofficially decided to 
change the name of the party at the Bologna Congress and triggered leftist 
realignment in ltaly th巴reafter.The policy shift of the PCI contained the 
possibility of fundamental changes which would bring an end to the frozen 
structure of conservative dominance by cancelling out internal divisions 
within the left (typically， the confrontation between socialists and commu-
nists) which had been regarded as unavoidable. Further， the PC1 
J¥ maintained that it was imperative to cooperate with social democratic 
parties such as the German SPD， British Labor Party and French Socialist 一
Party， aiming at reorganizing European left in the context of European 
integration， and applied for participation to Socialist International. This 
was perceived as a positive intention of the PC1， which had parted from 
I¥. 
Eurocommunism， toplay an indispensable role as a member of European 
left. 
This chapter analyzes the transformation of the ltalian Jeft in the 
context of the new tr巴ndof th巴EuropeanJeft to pursue economic democ同
racy beyond borders. In particular、1wilI revi巴wthe transformation ()f 
ltalian politics since the second half of the 1970s. One ()f the main factors 
that forced the PCI to change its strategies after the breakdown of 
compromesso storico was an巴mergence()f strong Jeadership of the PSI 
under Craxi. "司Thatwas the impact， then， ofa rapid change in the relation-
ship b巴tweenltalian socialists and communists O!1 party realignment in 
1 talian poJi tics ? 
1 The Strategies of The Italian Socialist Party 
The PSI in Italian Political System 
Unlike in northern and central European countries where huge 
reformist labor movements believing in Keynesianism and a compre-
hensive social democratic party played important roles in national 
politics， inItaly， there had been an exceptional party alignment that 
contained a huge communist party and a weak and small socialist 
party. 
Italy， too， saw broad citizens' movements demanding reform and 
political modernization in the 1970s. However， the PSI failed to 
昭 legitimize itself as a reforn市t leader 、明wl柏V寸巾/オhen
a討thand. It was the PCI that demonstrated reformist leadership in 
Italy. Postwar Italy was ruled by centralist governments led by the 
DC. In 1963， the PSI participated in the governing coalitio!1 to 
establish the socalled centro -sinistれ(l.Yet， the PSI's participation in 
the government was ful of contradictions. On the one hand， it
claimed the traditional social democratic ideology as the party 
conducting social reform. However， inreality， itneeded to collect 
votes as a power broker depending on the clientelistic convention in 
the South. And the PSI gradually showed symptoms of schizophre-
nia. Access to a political patronage syァstemin wァhichpolitical parties 
devastatingly control the state resources seriously injured solidarity 
within the PSI. The internal democracy that the PSI had adopted 
often caused conflicts among factions with regards to intra-party 
hegemony. And an introductio!1 to the patronage system deteriorated 
such internal cleavages， as enormous resources were abused in 
friction within the party. Meanwhile， the decision of the PSI to break 
with the PCI and ally with the DC in centro-sinistra governments 
seriously damaged leftist solidarity. The PSI consolidated a self 
image as component of inefficient regime by participating in the 
governments as a junior partner of the DCY) This resulted in an utter 
stagnation of the votes for the PSI even in the 1976 elections in which 
a climax of citizens' movement brought a drastic leftist turn among 
voters. A radicalization of the voters that characterized ltalian 
politics in the 1970s bypassed the PSI. 
Craxi's“Socialist Alternative"( 1977) !¥ 。
The PSI was a party that repeated internal divisions continuously !i: 
(1) David Hine. 1989“The Italian Socialist Party，" in Tom Gallagher and 
Allan M. Williams， eds.， Southe間 EuropeanSocialism. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press. 
七and figured out its own fate as a permanent medium-sized party(2)， 
although it increased clientelistic influences in the ltalian party 
system. Craxi's installation as Secretary， which brought drastic 
changes to the PSI， thus struck the ltalians by surprise. Contrary to 
most members' expectations， Craxi had already prepared a cleilr 
blueprint for acquisition of political power when he was elected in 
1976 as a stopgap secretary to fil the cleavages between the left and 
right within the party. Craxi's style placed the PSI in an utterly new 
phase in terms of party alignment and of ideology.ω 
Craxi tried to find a way for the PSI by choosing a gradual but 
certain transition to socialism through the reformist practices which 
just the northern European social democratic parties were doing. 
The biggest problem for the PSI was continuously sluggish votes. In 
order to overcome this problem， Craxi proposed a strategy to re. 
organize existing socia!ist forces into a new group led by the PSI. 
This meant a breakdown of the communist hegemony in the Italian 
left. Craxi carried out a series of severe criticisms of the PCI to 
realize his project.(4) His first attack on the PCI was that the PCI 
could not be an effective alternative to the DC rule， since there was 
a strong tie with Moscow even if the PCI pretended to be reformist. 
Further， Craxi criticized that出every hegemnony of the PCI within 
the left prevented the ltalian party system from developing. Accord-
九 (2) Norberto Bobbio. 1976.“Questione socialista questione comunista，" 
~、
さ Mondoperaぬ29，no. 9， p. 41-51. 
(3) Spencer M. Di Scala. 1988. Renewing Italian Socialism: Nenniω 
Craxi. New York: Oxford University Press. 
(4) Bettino Craxi 1978.“Il vangelo socialista，" L 'E者presso.27 agosto. 
ing to Craxi， the Italian political system could be expressed as 
“imperfect bipolarism" of the DC and PCI， inwhich the latter had no 
ability to take the place of the former， and consequently the DC 
maintained dominance. This， as a result， destabilized Italian politics， 
and caused successive crises and political paralysis. The only way to 
break such a deadlock， Craxi claimed， was to form a“socialist pole" 
by Italian Ieftist parties under the Ieadership of the PSI and end the 
vicious circle. This is Craxi's“socialist alternative." 
Craxi strategicaIly gave first priority to the concertation of the 
PSI with the sociaI democratic parties in other European countries in 
order to realize the “socia!ist alternative"， inwhich he thought that 
the more vot田 smaIIsocialist parties would gain， the more stable 
Italian politicaI system would become. On this account， he underlined 
the European parliament elections and played an active role， as a 
vice president， inthe Socialist InternationaI. Craxi challenged Eur-
ocommunism in this way by presenting a concept of eurosocialism. 
Eurocommunists had declared that West European communism 
should be distinguished from Marx叫 Leninism.Craxi severely attack-
ed them that such claim itself showed communist backwardness. He 
argued that eurosocialism was rooted in the democratic tradition in 
order to tackle the biggest problem of Europe : the presentation of an 
alternative to European reactionary conservatives. 
He f帥 erm山 moree伽 tsto cha附出ei叫 eof the PSI to 穴
a modern， refor汀出tand technocratic party. The structure and image さ
of the party as traditional class party， with comrade temperament， a 
centraI committee and even trade unions no Icmger played an impor-
tant role. Rather， Craxi， who had been stimulated by the skilIs of 
American electoral compaigns， urged his party to coopt broader 
interests of various voters by directly appealing to them through 
mass media. What Craxi carried out later as a symbol of his strategy 
was that the hammer and sickle party emblem were changed to a 
carnation. 
The Birth of Craxi Government (1983) 
The internal reform of the PS1 as described above yielded some 
actual fruits unexpectedly quickly. Under the centro--sinistr.αgovern. 
ment. the PS1 had to be subordinate to the DC. However， when the 
sllbsidence of the two major parties， the DC and the PCI， began in the 
1980s， the situation surrounding the PSI changed drastically. The 
pivotal position of the PS1 in the center-Ieft coalition government 
after the collapse of C011ψromesso storico essayed between the DC 
and the PC1 provided Craxi with a perfect opportunity to realize 
political realignment in ltaly to the advantage of the PSL(5) The 
compromesso storico suffered a setback， and the PCI which had 
disappointed trade unionists dramatically lost votes in the elections. 
The DC， which incllrred a feeling of distrllst among ltalian voters by 
a shocking P2 scandal， marked the worst post-war record of 32.9% 
in the general elections of 1983. Such a retreat of the DC and the PC1 
rapidly blloyed Ip the PSI. 1n 1976， itwas diffficult for the PSI to 
主伽a山 he“leftistalternative" based on an alliance b伽eensocial-
八 istsand commllnists， since the leftist groups within the party were 
stilI influentiaL Bllt Craxi was successful in sweeping off the left 
(5) Gianfranco Pasquino. 1983.“La strategia del PSI : tra vecchie e nouve 
forme di rappresental1za politica，" Crihιa MarxIsta. 110. 1 
within the party by 1980. And he made it possible to advocate a new 
strategy that reflected drastic changes in political circumstances.(6) 
Being convinced that the bargaining power of the PSI for the DC 
grew by leaps in comparison with that during the 1960s， Craxi 
declared that he had the intention to participate again in a coalition 
with the DC in order to enhance the governability of Italy. The votes 
for the PSI in 1983 elections (11.4%) increased by 1.6%. This is not 
a big growth. However， even such a litle il1crease of less than 2% 
was sufficient to let the DC agree to Craxi's proposal， when the votes 
for the DC decreased by 110 less thal1 6.6%. Craxi assumed office in 
August 1983 as the first socialist prime minister in ltaly. 
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(6) D. Hine. 1989‘ゆ• cit. 
The Neo-Liberal Policies of Craxi Government (1983-1987) 
The Craxi government was based on the recognition of the 
vulnerability of the DC and the awareness that they could not loose 
in elections any more. 1n this context. t出hiおsgovernmen此twa出sdifferent 
from the cαeωJηf的fかro"sin附1ηZ.おω!sνtraα i加nthe 19鮪60恥)治sin w守七恒hi註chthe PS臼1wa出ssubordi-
nate to the DC. Craxi fullyアuti1izedthe central position of the PS1 in 
the ideological spectrum of ltalian politics， and suggested that he had 
the intention to trv an alliance with the PCI if the PSI came to 
occupy a major position within the left. Particular1y after the 1983 
elections in which the DC suffered a severe loss， Craxi deepened his 
confidence and developed a series of policies such as the revision of 
scala lnoがた.and a reduction of the budget deficit. Craxi's adminis-
tration style， later called decisionismo， can be clearly distinguished 
from the Christian Democrats' decision-making style.(7) While 
maintaining a scrupulous and conciliatory stance in a process of 
policy-making， Craxi did not hesitate， when necessary. to oppose 
outright partners in the coalition government， President， the judicial 
authorities， and even major trade unions， not to mention the PCI. 
The policies of Craxi government， which were enforced in this way. 
corresponded to the new-conservatism rising in the United States 
and Britain in the sense that they interpreted the prolonging reces-
石 sionafter the oil crises as a debt of the incremental post-war welfare 
五 state. Among other things， the revision of sc，αla mobile by which 
Q Craxi wanted to reduce the power of trade unions which had been 
(7) David Hine. 1986.“The Craxi Premiership，" in Robert Leonardi and 
Raffaella Y. Nanetti， eds叶 Italia抗 Politiむs:A ReむiewVolU1恥 1.
London: Frances Pinter. pp. 105-116. 
building strong bases since the autunno caldo of 1969， and to make 
industrial relations more flexible， precisely showed characteristics of 
the Craxi government. 
Craxi started reducing the deficit by cutting the tax rate by 2% 
in 1984 and 85， and by enacting the revenue law which contained cuts 
in transfer payment and hea1th care. He further emphasized that the 
scala mobile， which was considered as a main source of inflation 
because of its over-protection of workers， must be reformed in order 
to erase the two-digit inflation. This claim faced intense resistance 
in the largest trade union CGIL and the PCI whose members had 
interpreted it as an implicit stipulation not to touch the scala mobile 
(la scala mobile non si tocca). In such a situation， Craxi enacted a 
restraint of the scala mobile by resorting to his unique decisionismo， 
a compulsory legal intervention. This aroused a storm of controversy 
and it developed into a referendum of June 1985 which questioned the 
legitimacy of Craxi's ordinance. The referendum turnout， 78%， was 
the worst record in post-war Italy， and “yes" votes for PCI/CGIL 
ended up 45.7% while “no" votes 54.3%. This result impressed Italian 
people as a fal of the PCI's hegemony.(8) In order to break economic 
stagnation and to fortify international competitivity， Craxi advocat-
ed new po1icies such as activating investment in industrial sectors， 
??????
opening the capital market， privatizing the state corporations. In 
Italy， like in other advanced countries， de叫regulatingeconomic 
activities was strongly demanded. In the general elections of 1987， 
(8) Peter Lange. 1986.“The end of an era : The wage indexation referen. 
dum of 1985，" in Leonardi and Nanetti， eds.， !ta/，必nPo/itics : A Re1Jiew 
Volume 1. p. 29-46. 
the PSI made great gains and recorded its highest results since the 
1950s， 14.3%. Contrarily， the PCI lost even more votes to the lowest 
level since the 1960s. ln 1976 when the PCI advocated compromesso 
storico， the difference of both parties votes was almost 25%. How-
ever， in1987， such difference was diminished to 12%. 
2 The Strategies of the Italian Communist Party 
The Rise and Fal of Compromesso Storico 
Enrico Berlinguer， then-secretary of the PCI， proposed a weII 
known strategy of C011ψromesso storico， recognizing， through the 
lessons of Chile in 1973， that stability of democracy required not only 
concertation among leftist forces but also broader aIIiances with the 
centrist in order to prevent the rise of ultra right wing. There came 
various interpretations about his COI1ψromesso storico. It was clear， 
however， that Berlinguer's assertion contained a strong message that 
only a compromise between the DC and the PCI could truly stabilize 
ltalian poIitics. Therefore， this was literaIIy a different cornpromise 
frOl11 a socialist transformation. Yet， under a situation in which 
leftist forces were growing since the autunno c，αldo in 1969， this 
proposal on the part of the PCI was perceived as a fully persuasive 
idea to overcome structural problems and to secure democratic 
??????
stability in Italy. Actually， a marvelous progress 'of the PCI in 1976 
elections and its unprecedented flexible shift of party policies seemed 
to create a possibility to break the Italian irnpasse in the middle of 
the 1970s. During the period of solidarie必 nazionale，1976-79， the 
influence of the PCI covered almost alI fields of Italian political 
economy， and the issue of the PCI's participation into the govern-
ment was most seriously argued. 
However， the second oiI crisis starting in 1979 rendered the future 
of compromesso storico extremely difficult. The CGIL， which strong-
ly backed participation of the PCI in the coalition government， was 
initially very positive in cooperating to the wage restraint along the 
austere policy line advocated by the PCI in exchange for further 
opening of investment information， and maintaining decent levels of 
employment. But the austere policy the PCI proposed only imposed 
a heavy cost on trade unions and the reward from the state for their 
cooperation was not provided at length. Dissatisfaction among 
workers gradually deepened.(9) The labor movement represented by 
the CGIL sought a form of workers' political participation known as 
Yet， neo-corporatist interest intermediation in neo-corporatlsm. 
Italy was impossible as far as the PCI's government participation 
was not realizedYO) 
There lay a formidable strategy of the DC vis-a-vis the PCI 
behind the setback of compromeぉostorico. In spite of al the efforts 
the PCl had made， the Christian Democratic leaders did not even 
expect their compromise with the PCI would be an historic one that 
??????
would endure. The Christian Democrats did al they could do in order 
to make the situation disadvantageous for the PCI even at the f1ux 
(9) for a theoretical fromework in this period， see Alessandro Pizzorno. 
1977.“Scambio politico e identita colletiva nel conflitto di c1asse，" in C. 
Crouch e A. Pizzorno， a cura di， Conjlitto in Europa: Lofta di classe， 
fすindacatie stato dopo il '68.お1i1ano: Etas Libri. 
(10) Marino Regini. 1981. 1 dilemmi del sindacafo. Bologna: I Mulino. 
of compromesso storico. As a matter of fact， the ltalian government 
at that time， asknown for notorious monocolore government， consist-
ed only of cabinet Ministers from the DC， and just reflected the 
balance of power among the DC factions. When the vulnerability of 
the PCI became clear， the DC immediately broke off its cooperation 
with the PCI. 
Another factor elucidating the failure of Berlinguer's intention 
was that direct access of the PCI to the DC bypassing the PSI 
provided the laUer with an excuse for renouncing its policy after 
retracting the center-left line， PSI's policy since the beginning of the 
1970s not to take part in the government without the PCI. This policy 
一shiftof the PSI diminished their distance with the DC and deter-
mined political isolation of the PCI. An arrogant prediction by the 
PCI that the PSI was at best a second-class party which would never 
play an important role for the ltalian future strained the relationship 
between the two parties. When Craxi promoted intra-party reform 
after 1976 and strengthened the poitical voice of the PSI， the PCI was 
forced into a difficult position. The PCI was once an indispensable 
partner of the government， but such a role was no longer valid after 
1979. The PCI had to clarify its own strategy in oppsition to the 
government and deepened its crack with the PSI. 
??????
From the Compromesso Storico to the Democratic Alternative 
At the end of the 1970s when a breakdown of the compromesso 
storico became clear， the PCI had to recognize its own position as an 
opposition party. After that the PCI was faced with an impasse in 
which the party was politically alienated most seriously through 
1970s and 80s， althought it had obtained a much stronger influence 
compared with that in the 1960s. The fact that the DC no longer 
needed the support of the PCI forced the party into a subordinate and 
unstable position. In addition， a prolonged recession poured cold 
water on labor movements， and the influence of trade unions rapidly 
shrank in the 1980s.(1) It was an historic Fiat strike in September 
1980 that critically determined the further retreat of the PCI/CGIL. 
Fiat at that time suffered from a world-wide recession like 
automobile producers in other countries. Managers tried to get out of 
this predicament by long-term lay-offs for no fewer than 20，000 
workers. The labor rebelled intensely by a retaliatory general strike. 
The PCI stood in an extremely difficult position. While requesting 
the three major unions (the CGIL， the CISL and the UIL) for strike 
relaxation at Fiat， the PCI at the same time tried to utilize this 
opportunity to embarrass the PSI which had gradually increased its 
influence and to send a clear message on the part of the PCI for a 
coalition government. Berlinguer himself went to Turin at the end of 
September， and declared， infront of Fiat workers， that the PCI 
totally supported the strike. Meanwhile， Craxi claimed that workers 
should be more responsible in order to overcome the economic crises 
??
?
? ? ?
in Italy and appealed strongly for a strike restraint. What Craxi 
emphasized was his own governabilita. The PCI evaluated this nega・
? ?? ?
Mimmo Carrieri and Carlo Donolo. 1986.“The Political System as a 
Problem for the Trade Unions in ltaly: 1975-1983，" in O. Jacobi， B.
Jessop， H. Kastendiek and M. Regini， eds.， EconomiヒCrisis，Trade 
Unions and the State. London: Croom Helm.; Gianprimo Cella and 
Tiziano Treu. 1986.“Coolective Barganing，" in Jacobi et al. eds. 
tively， criticizing that the PSI has already lost the nature of a labor 
party. On October 10， the unions carried out a general strike again. 
The supervisors dissatisfied with such unions' action organized an 
anti-strike demonstration called “supervisors' march" on October 14 
and turned out to the center of Turin city in force involving no fewer 
than 40，000 white-collar workers. On this account， the Fiat strike 
that had continued for 35 days suddenly came to an end with a 
victory on the managers' side. This event told that he decline of the 
PCI/CGIL had already begun，021 
As the PSI were going into the very core of Italian politics， the 
PCI quickly reacted. In November 1980， Berlinguer proposed a 
project of coalition government excluding the DC， and shifted the 
basic strategy of the PCI from the old comprome澗ostrorico to a 
“democratic alternative" in which the party would cooperate with 
the PSI in order to give birth to a new government in Italy. However， 
the PCI took much time to organizationally formulate this subtle 
new strategy since Berlinguer decided such a policy-shift at his own 
discretion withiout even sounding out the feelings of the central 
committee. 
Meanwhile， the PSI， an indispensable partner to the new strategy 
of the PCI， was already slanted largely toward an alliance with the 
天 DC.The PSI was preparing a scenario to isolate the PCI and to 
九 acquire the premiership. After Craxi was installed as prime minister 
さ in1983， the confrontation between the PSI and the PCI sharpened. 
(12) Stephen Hellman. 198. Italian Communism in Transition，' The Rise 
and Tal! 01 the Historic Com，ρromise in Turin， 1975 -1980. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. p. 106-109. 
The PSI， which was expected to be a partner of the “democratic 
alternative" the PCI advocated， intended to drive the PCI to a 
periphery of the Italian political system， to rob of al the votes for 
the PCI， and to acquire the hegemony of the Italian left. As a result， 
the PCI which was put on the defensive had to attack Craxi after al， 
and the “democratic alternative" was gradually loosing its meaning. 
Having recognized that what one party could attain was quite 
limited either by participating in or by accessing the government， the 
PCI came to be subordinated to other parties. In particular， among 
European leftist parties which had been directly hit by the recession 
and unable to find a way out of social democratic dilemma， the 
position of the PCI was especially difficult. The PCI had to make a 
more complicated response to the problems concerning the identity 
and structure of the party than that of other leftist parties in that it 
was communist.(13) Faced with such an impasse， an assertion that the 
PCI should change the name to totally wipe out a communist label 
already gained considerable support among the party leaders in the 
first half of the 1980s. Luciano Lama， then Secretary of the CGIL， 
pro-PCI trade union， suggested that the PCI should take part in the 
Socialist International in cooperation with the PSI. Giorgio 
Napolitano， an executive of the PCI， agreed with Lama's view and 
insisted that long-lasting conflicts between communists and social- 天
ists in Italy were completely meaningless. However， a more substan胎 J¥ 
tial problem was the very fact that the PCI had lost its identity. さ
What should be sought for as a new identity the PCI could base itself 
U3) Gianfranco Paswuino. 1985.“Il PCI nel rompicapo italiano，" Rinascita 
no.26. 
on? The issue was extremely complex and opinion within the party 
was divided. Berlingure's death in June 1984 collected sympathy 
among voters， and the PCI made a historical record of 33.3% that 
slightly exceeded the votes for the DC in the European Parliament 
Election of 1984. However， defeats in the local elections in the next 
year， 1985， firmly impressed the Italian voters of the fatal slump of 
the PCI. 
The PCI in Transition (1984ω1988) 
The “democratic alternative" line that the PCI under Berlinguer' 
s leadership adopted in 1980 as a substitute for the compromesso 
storico was inherited by Alessandro N atta elected as the Secretary 
after the death of Berlinguer. At出.e17th Congress in Florence in 
1986， the meaning of this slogan was reconfirmed. The Congress 
emphasized that the PCI was an integral part of the European Left， 
defining the PCI as a party extremely close to the West German 
SPD. At the same time it was made clear that various problems Italy 
faced must be solved not only by a domestic strategy but also by a 
European-level strategy.(14) 
However， the realization of the “democratic alternative" the PCI 
declared as an aim was not easy. The first barrier was the PSI， the 
夫 biggestand most indispensable partner for the PCI. It was very 
全 probablethat the PSI might only utilize the st凶 egyof the PCI in 
6 order to increase its own influence without breaking off relations 
(14) JoanBarth Urban. 198.“The PCI's 17th Congress: a triumph of the 
new internationalism，" in R. Nanetti， R.Leonardi and P. Corbetta， 
eds.， ltal;勿nPolitics : A Review Volume 2. London: Frances Pinter. 
with the DC， making the most of its subtle position in-between the 
PCI and the DC， even thought the PSI was closer to the PCI. Craxi 
s“socialist alternative" by which he appealed for a convergence of 
the Italian left around the PSI had already transformed into almost 
a rhetorical expression through Pentapartito (five-party coalition) 
governments since 1983. Moreover， the PRI， the second largest 
potential partner， displayed the least hostility to the PCI within the 
Pentaparitito governments. But it seemed difficult for the PRI to 
share a common base with the PCI， since the former advocated pro 
American foreign policies， maximum pursuit of market mechanism， 
and support for nucJear power generation. 1n addition， neither the 
PSI nor the PRI seriously considered an alliance with the PCI 
possible in near future. Particularly， a“communist" image of the PCI 
was hardly accepted by the PSI and the PRI， even though the PCI 
redefined itself as a social democratic force. The biggest problem 
was that the total votes for the PCI， the PSI and the PRI did not 
seem to reach a majority. To solve this problem， an .idea tυinvite the 
PSDI， the Proletarian Democrats， and the Greens into the coalition 
was proposed. Yet， a six-party al1iance appeared total1y unattaina-
ble， since even a three-party coalition of the PCI， the PSI and the 
PRI was difficult because of the heterogeneity among the partiesYS) 
Such a difficult situation of the PCI brought an unprecedented defeat 天
in the general elections of June 1987 after the resignation of Prime ハ
Minister Craxi. The 26.6% was actually almost a 8% decrease 九
(15) Donald Sassoon. 1989.“The 1987 Elections and the PCI，" in Robert 
L巴onardiand Piergiorgio Corbetta，巴ds.，]falian Poli万'cs: A Review 
Volume :3. London: Frances Pint巴r.
compared with the 1976 elections (34.4%). This meant a return to the 
oId low levels of before the autunno caldo in which the PCI was 
excluded from the political arena (27.0% in the 1968 elections). A 
more devastating fact for the PCI was its loss of votes concentrated 
in the N orthern industrial area and in Middle Italy. The PCI lost the 
votes of workers and the youth. Quite contrarily， the PSI recorded a 
marvelous growth again. It obtained 14.3% which increased by 2.9% 
compared with the 1983 elections. The Greens also grew to be 
recognized as a socialized political force. 
Occhetto's New Strategy and European Left 
Subsidence of the PCI was n.ot confined to a complete defeat in 
the 1987 elections. ln the local elections of 1988 its decline further 
continued. The difference between the votes for the PCI and for the 
PSI shrank further (4.4%) and a sense of impending crisis within the 
PCI increased. Repeated retreat in elections drove Natta into resig-
nation. In June 1988， Achille Occhetto was elected through an intra 
-party conflict as new Secretary. The fact that the secretary was not 
elected unanimously itself verified the party's real democratization. 
For Occhetto， however， the situation was extremely serious. While 
social democratic governments led by Mitterand and Gonzarez were 
天 stablefor a long period， the communist parti田 inFrance and Spain. 
五~ earlier Euro-communist sworn friends of the PCI， were forced into 
Q the periphery and very their existence appeared unsteady. The PCI， 
faced with a severe catch-up of the PSI， needed a totally new 
strategy which would bring a drastic change of the situation. 
In March 1989， atthe 18th Congress in Rome， Occhetto came out 
to the first bet. He officially declared an abandonment of democratic 
centralism， and asserted that the party must change from the roots. 
Simultaneously， Occhetto shifted the base of the party from workers 
to the citizens in general， and redefined the PCI as a party pursuing 
environmental protection and equality between women and men. 
Furthermore， he made clear his policies to reinforce solidarity with 
West European social democratic parties such as West German SPD， 
French Socialist Party and British Labor Party and to commit more 
positively to expand influences of European Left with the soon-to-be 
realized European integration in 192.(16) 
The post-PCI and Convergence of Italian Left 
The European Parliament Elections of June 1989 brought a 
“victory" to Occhetto contrary to general expectations. The PCI 
increased its votes to 27.7%， a 1.1% growth compared with the 1987 
general elections. A dec1ining tendency that had lasted for many 
years was stopped. A vigor revived after a long absence to the 
windows of Botteghe Oscure， the PCI headquarters in Rome， and how 
this colPo rosso (red blow) the European Elections gave would affect 
ltalian politics attracted attention.(17) 
Occhetto made a bolder gamble again. It was a gamble to rebuild 
the party and the Italian left by discarding the name of Italian 天
四Communist Party. This seemed to be a logical next step for PCI that ~ 
had already abolished democratic centralism and walked along a 
reformist line. The name of communists no longer repr白 entedthe 
(16) L'Es，ρreso， 14maggio 1989. 
(17) L宏司presso，25 giugno 1989. 
reality of the PCI. Occhetto， who had realized the limitation of 
communism by the Tien An Mien massacre of June 1989， recognized 
necessity to acceJerate reforms of the PCI. 1n addition， drastic 
political changes in East Europe， particularly the fact that Hungar-
ian communist party which had transformed into a socialist party 
appJied for participation into the Socialist International to Wily 
Brandt， sharply stimulated him. Having witnessed the breakdown of 
the Berlin Wall in November 1989， Occhetto at last decided to 
change the name of the PCI.(l8) 
What Occhetto aimed at in this bet was to coJlect extensively al 
the forces of the dispersed， stagnant and energyless Italian left and 
to start an engine. Behind such a serious call for a grand alliance of 
the left， there lay a recognition that the left was not able to take 
office in ltaly because of the too large influences of the PCI within 
the leftist forces. This project of Occhetto made recalled the “Epinee' 
Congress" in France， June 1971. The divided French left cooperated 
with each other under the leadership of Mitterand who proposed a 
project of union de la gauche， and eventually took office ten years 
later. As a matter of fact， however， there existed several con. 
frontational opinions within the party with regards to what kind of 
party the post-PCI should be， and multiple scenarios on party's new 
天 nameand new policies were presented by each intra-party faction 
二 suchas Occhetto's， N apolitano's， and 1ngrao's factionY9) The Bolo-
gna extra Congress of March 1990 was carried out in this situation， 
where Occhetto pressed down opposition groups and obtained con-
(18) L'Esがお50，26 novembr巴1989.
sensus of two thirds of the party to his scenario.(20) 
Occhetto's scenario sought for liberal democracy. While 
maintaining a rivalry with the PSI， the party was assumed to join in 
the Socialist International in cooperatin with the PSI. The biggest 
bet in his scenario was his attempt to introduce new forces from the 
outside and to absorb them into the party. He wanted to coopt broad 
forces in civil society including the independent left， greens， a part of 
anti-DC Catholic forces， and the women's movement. His scenario 
assumed Occhetto himself as Secretary， Vittorio Foa as President， 
and an environmentalist leader， Gianfranco Amendola， as an 
executive.(21) Further， what in particular attracted attention was that 
the thought of N orberto Bobbio， a foremost political theorist in ltaly， 
was advocated as a basic principle of the post-PCI. Bobbio is a 
philosopher who has been theoretically examined if two mutually 
contradictory notions， socialist ideal-equality and distributional 
justice-and individuals' freedom， could be compatible. He has been 
thoroughly criticizing communism as a restriction to individuals' 
liberty.(2) lt showed a true transformation of the PCI that Occhetto 
definitely s1.ipported Bobbio's philosophy. A slant to Bobbio and 
abandonment of communism meant that an ideological wall that had 
separated the PCI from the PSI was now virtually taken away. This 
made it more possible that a relationship between them would be 天
(19) L宏司tresso，1 marzo 190. 
(却1) L宮'spresso，25 marzo/l aprile 190. 
帥 L'Estresso， 26novembre 1989. 。2) Norberto Bobbio. 1984. I1 Futuro della democrazia. Torino: Einaudi.; 
idem.1976.。ωlesocialismo? Toriho : Einaudi. 
radically il11proved. Actually， Craxi hil1self showed up as an 
observer at the Extra Congress in Bologna in March 1990 and 
suggested his concerns about such project of leftist realignl11ent. This 
l11ight indicate the thaw between the PCI and the PSI.(23) If these two 
parties l11ade mutual concessions， itseemed possible that they would 
introduce new vigor into permanently stagnant ltalian politics. This 
contained a possibility to bring a drastic change to ltalian politics 
that had never achieved in even one leftist government， exceptionally 
in advanced societies. Yet， this possibility had to depend 011 the 
outbreak of Tangentoρoli， unprecedented scandals in post-war ltaly， 
to be realized later. 
The Local Elections and New Issues 
The local elections that were carried out in this situation il1 May 
1990 attracted world attention as a predicative indicator of the 
success of Occhetto's new strategy. But the votes for the PCI fel 
short of 24%， a further retreat in comparison with the 30.2% of the 
local elections five years prior and the 27.8% of the general election 
of 1987. Occhetto spoke in defense of his choice:“the 23% is a 
satisfactory figure if the East European situation is taken into 
account. Without new strategies， the PCI might have been faced with 
天 ruin."Yet， attacks from oppositio時 roupswithin the party increased 
~ and objective analysis of the situation was needed urgently.(24) The 
四 PSI，contrarily， secured more than 15% of the votes， which exceeded 
the 13.3% of the last local elections and the 14.3% of the 1987 general 
(お.) L 'Espresso， 18 marzo 1990. 
(2~) L'E，presso， 20 maggio 1990. 
eIctions. This was stil an insufficient figure for the PSI to take the 
place of the PCI. The votes of the DC， 33.8%， did not grow compared 
with the 35% in the last local elections. On the other hand， anti-
emigrant local parties made an unexpected success in N orthern ltaly 
including Lombardia and Veneto. They increased influences after-
ward holding elections at some crucial phases in the 1990s which 
would determine the direction of national politics， i.e. if it swung to 
the right or turned to the left. 
The result of the local elections of May 1990 suggested that the 
coalition government led by the DC and the PSI would be maintained 
for a while. Occhetto's scenario aiming at a realization of a leftist 
coalition government seemed extremely difficult at thaf time. In 
particular， a“wall of 50%" appeared unclimbable for leftist parties 
either alone or by alliance. Only one exception in advanced societies 
was Swedish politics in which leftist forces had attained stable 
governments for considerably long a period.(25) Yet， this wall was 
unclimbable for the right also. The choices of the PSI and centralist 
parties， therefore， came to have more important meanings. 
The Birth of the Democratic Party of the Left 
In such a difficult and fluid situation， two years of deliberation 
had already passed until the PCI reached a conclusion concerning the 天
0 direction and name of a new party. Meanwhile， Craxi， who challen- 一
(お，) Stefano Bartolini. 1979・“Lasinistra nei sistemi partitici europei : 1917 五
ー1978，"Rivista ltaliana di Scienza Politica 9. ; Adam Przeworski and 
John Sprague. 1986. Paper Stones : A HistoηI 01 Electoral Soc勿lism.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
ged new strategies of the PCI， surprised everbody including members 
of his staft when he decided at his own discretion to call the PSI the 
Unita Socia/ista on October 4， 190.(26) This reflected Craxi's new 
policies to transcend a traditional concept of “party". His caIculation 
behind this was to impress upon ltalian voters that his party was 
ahead of the PCI. 
Such an unexpected decision of Craxi made the turn of the PCI 
inevitable and more urgent. On October 10， Occhetto at last officially 
announced that the name of a new party would be Partito Demo-
cratico della Sinistnα(Democratic Party of the Left) and he showed 
a design of new symbol for the party at the same time. 
N onetheless， there was a storm of criticism toward Occhetto 
within the party， both from the right led by N apolitano who claimed 
a necessity to cooperate with Craxi and from the left who stil 
cherished attachment to the PCI. And the party contained the poten-
tial peril of division.(27) However， Occhetto negated the possibiIty of 
split， insisting that the PDS was based on the history of the PCI and 
leaving the party meant a denial of the glorious communist tradition 
in Italy. He put a check on both the left and the right within the 
party.(28) 
What the Italian experience verified was the following three 
豆 points:First， unless socialists and communists cooperate with each 
九~ other， no leftist government would be realized. Secondly， inorder to 
さ bondwith socialists， the PCI needed to abandon communist labels 
。6) L'Estresso， 14ottobre 190. 
(27) Panorama， 21ottobre 190. 
ω~ L'Eゆr側 0，21 ottobre 190. 
and to redefine itself as a citizens' party. Thirdly， as a result， the new 
party would join in a trend toward the European left that would 
reform economic structures in a democratic political framework. It 
is a trend toward a new form of democracy constituted by citizens 
including women and ecological movements in society with gradually 
decreasing manufacturing workers. 
Conclusion 
Craxi's strategy was based on his own recognition that a con噌
frontational structure composed of Marxist labor movements vis-a 
vis traditional catholic culture was about to break down. Craxi thus 
expected that many votes once directed to the two major parties， the 
DC and the PCI， would turn to reformist small and medium-sized 
parties led by the PSI. However， such a scenario did not have 
sufficient grounds. L 'efto Cr，似 idid exist. Yet， itis difficult to 
conclude that Craxi changed ltalian politics from the roots. The PSI' 
s vote was at most 15%， which appeared clearly a small figure if 
compared with those of social democratic parties in other Latin 
European countries. The PSI， after al， did not grow enough 
to be a catch -al party. Craxi was not able to change the ltalian 
left. 
As often argued， Craxi's adm凶 strationwas certainly excep“豆
J¥ tional in long governments in post-war Italian politics困 Butit is not ~ 
correct to attribute this exceptionality to his neo-liberal policies :S 
alone. An economic recovery in Italy since 1985 seems to have 
resulted not from Craxi's policies but from an international factor 
that each advanced country's economy had escaped from recession 
and from a domestic factor that economic restructuring in the 
production sector which had already been started before Craxi's 
government was bearing fruit finally at that time. It is possible to say 
that the effect of Craxi was limited. 
On the other hand， the PCI has constantly sought renovation: 
from Berlinguer's comρromesso storico to“democratic alternative" 
and to Occhetto's even more radical reforms. One of the most 
meaningful contributions of Berlinguer was that he urged the PCI to 
reform itself by showing the possibility to take office through an 
aIiance with other parties.(29) Changes of the PCI encouraged by 
Berlinguer consolidated its image as a political force that played a 
game based on a democratic rule and created a space in which other 
parties seriously considered the PCI as a potential member of gov-
ernment. Berlinguer's claim， -commitment of the PCI to political 
pluralism and to democratic institutions， approval of NATO， criti噌
cism to Soviet political system-， fully renovated the PCI. lt grew to 
become a significant political force. However， itwas impossible that 
communists represented Italian left as a whole. The compromesso 
storico which excluded the PSI broke down. And a shift to the 
“democratic alternative" alone could not cancel out a confrontation 
with the PSI. A possibility to overcome internal conflicts within the 
豆 ltalianleft was brought 0叶yafter the complete abandonment policy 
七っ ofcommunism by Occhetto was realized. 
6 However， the ltalian left by itself was not able to cha時 ethe 
entire Italian politics. For the real reform and realignment， strong 
extra-parliamentary factors outside the Italian party system， a 
series of political scandals and the citizens' demand for justice， 
needed to emerge later. 
(29) Stephen Hellman. 1986. 'マheltalian Communist Party between Ber. 
Iinguer and Seventeenth Congress，" in Italian Politics: A Revicw 
Volume 1. Donald Sasson. 1981. The Strategy 01 the Italian Communist 
Party. New York: St. Martin's Press. 
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